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31.7.08

Yours Truly at the Hellespont



In the figure of the Persian king Xerxes, Herodotus achieved a magisterial portrait of an unstable despot, an archetype that has plagued the sleep of liberal democracies ever since.

Persian Wars History—the rational and methodical study of the human past—was invented by a single man just under twenty-five hundred years ago; just under twenty-five years ago, when I was starting a graduate degree in Classics, some of us could be pretty condescending about the man who invented it and (we’d joke) his penchant for flowered Hawaiian shirts.

The risible figure in question was Herodotus, known since Roman times as “the Father of History.” The sobriquet, conferred by Cicero, was intended as a compliment. Herodotus’ Histories—a chatty, dizzily digressive nine-volume account of the Persian Wars of 490 to 479 B.C., in which a wobbly coalition of squabbling Greek city-states twice repulsed the greatest expeditionary force the world had ever seen—represented the first extended prose narrative about a major historical event. (Or, indeed, about virtually anything.) And yet to us graduate students in the mid-nineteen-eighties the word “father” seemed to reflect something hopelessly parental and passé about Herodotus, and about the sepia-toned “good war” that was his subject. These were, after all, the last years of the Cold War, and the terse, skeptical manner of another Greek historian—Thucydides, who chronicled the Peloponnesian War, between Athens and Sparta, two generations later—seemed far more congenial. To be an admirer of Thucydides’ History, with its deep cynicism about political, rhetorical, and ideological hypocrisy, with its all too recognizable protagonists—a liberal yet imperialistic democracy and an authoritarian oligarchy, engaged in a war of attrition fought by proxy at the remote fringes of empire—was to advertise yourself as a hardheaded connoisseur of global Realpolitik.

Herodotus, by contrast, always seemed a bit of a sucker. Whatever his desire, stated in his Preface, to pinpoint the “root cause” of the Persian Wars (the rather abstract word he uses, aitiē, savors of contemporary science and philosophy), what you take away from an initial encounter with the Histories is not, to put it mildly, a strong sense of methodical rigor. With his garrulous first-person intrusions (“I have now reached a point at which I am compelled to declare an opinion that will cause offense to many people”), his notorious tendency to digress for the sake of the most abstruse detail (“And so the Athenians were the first of the Hellenes to make statues of Hermes with an erect phallus”), his apparently infinite susceptibility to the imaginative flights of tour guides in locales as distant as Egypt (“Women urinate standing up, men sitting down”), reading him was like—well, like having an embarrassing parent along on a family vacation. All you wanted to do was put some distance between yourself and him, loaded down as he was with his guidebooks, the old Brownie camera, the gimcrack souvenirs—and, of course, that flowered polyester shirt.

A major theme of the Histories is the way in which time can effect surprising changes in the fortunes and reputations of empires, cities, and men; all the more appropriate, then, that Herodotus’ reputation has once again been riding very high. In the academy, his technique, once derided as haphazard, has earned newfound respect, while his popularity among ordinary readers will likely get a boost from the publication of perhaps the most densely annotated, richly illustrated, and user-friendly edition of his Histories ever to appear: “The Landmark Herodotus” (Pantheon; $45), edited by Robert B. Strassler and bristling with appendices, by a phalanx of experts, on everything from the design of Athenian warships to ancient units of liquid measure. (Readers interested in throwing a wine tasting à la grecque will be grateful to know that one amphora was equal to a hundred and forty-four kotyles.)

The underlying cause—the aitiē—of both the scholarly and the popular revival is worth wondering about just now. It seems that, since the end of the Cold War and the advent of the Internet, the moment has come, once again, for Herodotus’ dazzlingly associative style and, perhaps even more, for his subject: implacable conflict between East and West.

Modern editors, attracted by the epic war story, have been as likely as not to call the work “The Persian Wars,” but Herodotus himself refers to his text simply as the publication of his historiē—his “research” or “inquiry.” The (to us) familiar-looking word historiē would to Herodotus’ audience have had a vaguely clinical air, coming, as it did, from the vocabulary of the newborn field of natural science. (Not coincidentally, the cradle of this scientific ferment was Ionia, a swath of Greek communities in coastal Asia Minor, just to the north of Halicarnassus, the historian’s birthplace.) The word only came to mean “history” in our sense because of the impact of Herodotus’ text.

The Greek cities of Ionia were where Herodotus’ war story began, too. These thriving settlements, which maintained close ties with their mother cities across the Aegean to the west, began, in the early sixth century B.C., to fall under the dominion of the rulers of the Asiatic kingdoms to the east; by the middle of the century, however, those kingdoms were themselves being swallowed up in the seemingly inexorable westward expansion of Persia, led by the charismatic empire builder Cyrus the Great. The Histories begins with a tale that illustrates this process of imperialist digestion—the story of Croesus, the famously wealthy king of Lydia. For Herodotus, Croesus was a satisfyingly pivotal figure, “the first barbarian known to us who subjugated and demanded tribute from some Hellenes” but who nonetheless ended up subjugated himself, blinded by his success to the dangers around him. (Before the great battle that cost him his kingdom, he had arrogantly misinterpreted a pronouncement of the Delphic oracle that should have been a warning: “If you attack Persia, you will destroy a great empire.” And he did—his own.) The fable-like arc of Croesus’ story, from a deceptive and short-lived happiness to a tragic fall arising from smug self-confidence, admirably serves what will turn out to be Herodotus’ overarching theme: the seemingly inevitable movement from imperial hubris to catastrophic retribution.

The fall of Croesus, in 547 B.C., marked the beginning of the absorption of the Ionian Greeks into the Persian empire. Half a century later, starting in 499, these Greeks began a succession of open rebellions against their Persian overlords; it was this “Ionian Revolt” that triggered what we now call the Persian Wars, the Asian invasions of the Greek mainland in 490 and 480. Some of the rebellious cities had appealed to Athens and Sparta for military aid, and Athens, at least, had responded. Herodotus tells us that the Great King Darius was so infuriated by this that he instructed a servant to repeat to him the injunction “Master, remember the Athenians!” three times whenever he sat down to dinner. Contemporary historians see a different, less personal motive at the root of the war that was to follow: the inevitable, centrifugal logic of imperialist expansion.

Darius’ campaign against the Greeks, in 490, and, after his death, that of his son Xerxes, in 480-479, constituted the largest military undertakings in history up to that point. Herodotus’ lavish descriptions of the statistic-boggling preparations—he numbers Xerxes’ fighting force at 2,317,610 men, a figure that includes infantry, marines, and camel-riders—are among the most memorable passages of his, or any, history. Like all great storytellers, he takes his sweet time with the details, letting the dread momentum build as he ticks off each stage of the invasion: the gathering of the armies, their slow procession across continents, the rivers drunk dry, the astonishing feats of engineering—bridging the Hellespont, cutting channels through whole peninsulas—that more than live up to his promise, in the Preface, to describe erga thōmasta, “marvellous deeds.” All this, recounted in a tone of epic grandeur that self-consciously recalls Homer, suggests why most Greek cities, confronted with the approaching hordes, readily acceded to Darius’ demand for symbolic tokens of submission—“earth and water.” (In a nice twist, the defiant Athenians, a great naval power, threw the Persian emissaries into a pit, and the Spartans, a great land force, threw them down a well—earth and water, indeed.)

And yet, for all their might, both Persian expeditions came to grief. The first, after a series of military and natural disasters, was defeated at the Battle of Marathon, where a fabulously outnumbered coalition of Athenians and Plataeans held the day, losing only a hundred and ninety-two men to the Persians’ sixty-four hundred. (The achievement was such that the Greeks, breaking with their tradition of taking their dead back to their cities, buried them on the battlefield and erected a grave mound over the spot. It can still be seen today.) Ten years later, Darius’ son Xerxes returned to Greece, having taken over the preparations for an even vaster invasion. Against all odds, the scrappy Greek coalition—this one including ultraconservative Sparta, usually loath to get involved in Panhellenic doings—managed to resist yet again.

It is to this second, far grander conflict that the most famous Herodotean tales of the Persian Wars belong; not for nothing do the names Thermopylae and Salamis still mean something today. In particular, the heroically suicidal stand of the three hundred Spartans—who, backed by only a couple of thousand allied troops, held the pass at Thermopylae against tens of thousands of Persians, long enough for their allies to escape and regroup farther to the south—has continued to resonate. Partly, this has to do with Herodotus’ vivid description of the Greeks’ feisty insouciance, a quality that all freedom fighters like to be able to claim. On hearing that the Persians were so numerous that their arrows would “blot out the sun,” one Spartan quipped that this was good news, as it meant that the Greeks would fight in the shade. (“In the shade” is the motto of an armored division in the present-day Greek Army.)

But the persistent appeal of such scenes, in which the outnumbered Greeks unexpectedly triumph over the masses of Persian invaders, is ultimately less a matter of storytelling than of politics. Although Herodotus is unwilling to be anything but neutral on the relative merits of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy (in a passage known as the “Debate on Government,” he has critical things to say about all three), he ultimately structures his presentation of the war as a kind of parable about the conflict between free Western societies and Eastern despotism. (The Persians are associated with motifs of lashing, binding, and punishment.) While he isn’t shy about portraying the shortcomings of the fractious Greek city-states and their leaders, all of them, from the luxury-loving Ionians to the dour Spartans, clearly share a desire not to answer to anyone but their own leaders.

Anyone, at any rate, was preferable to the Persian overlord Xerxes, who in Herodotus’ narrative is the subject of a magisterial portrait of corrupted power. No one who has read the Histories is likely to forget the passage describing the impotent rage of Xerxes when his engineers’ first attempt to create a bridge from Asia to Europe across the Hellespont was washed away by a storm: after commanding that the body of water be lashed three hundred times and symbolically fettered (a pair of shackles was tossed in), he chastised the “bitter water” for wronging him, and denounced it as “a turbid and briny river.” More practically, he went on to have the project supervisors beheaded.

Herodotus’ Xerxes is, however, a character of persuasive complexity, the swaggering cruelty alternating with childish petulance and sudden, sentimental paroxysms of tears: it’s a personality likely to remind contemporary audiences of a whole panoply of dangerous dictators, from Nero to Hitler. One of the great, unexpected moments in the Histories, evoking the emotional finesse of the best fiction, comes when Xerxes, reviewing the ocean of forces he has assembled for the invasion, suddenly breaks down, “overcome,” as he puts it to his uncle Artabanus (who has warned against the enterprise), “by pity as I considered the brevity of human life.” Such feeling for human life, in a dictator whose casual indifference to it is made clear throughout the narrative, is a convincing psychological touch. The unstable leader of a ruthlessly centralized authoritarian state is a nightmare vision that has plagued the sleep of liberal democracies ever since Herodotus created it.

Gripping and colorful as the invasions and their aftermaths are, the Greco-Persian Wars themselves make up just half of the Histories—from the middle of Book 5 to the end of the ninth, and final, book. This strongly suggests that Herodotus’ preoccupation was with something larger still.

The first four and a half books of the Histories make up the first panel of what is, in fact, a diptych: they provide a leisurely account of the rise of the empire that will fall so spectacularly in the second part. Typically, Herodotus gives you everything you could conceivably want to know about Persia, from the semi-mythical, Oedipus-like childhood of Cyrus (he’s condemned to exposure as a baby but returns as a young man, disastrously for those who wanted him to die), to the imperial zenith under Darius, a scant two generations later. (Darius, who had a talent for unglamorous but useful administrative matters—he introduced coined money, a reliable postal system, and the division of the empire into manageable provinces called satrapies—was known as “the shopkeeper.”) From book to book, the Histories lets you track Persia’s expansion, mapped by its conflicts with whomever it is trying to subjugate at the time.

In Book 1, there are the exotic Massagetae, who were apparently strangers to the use, and abuse, of wine. (The Persians—like Odysseus with the Cyclops—get them drunk and then trounce them.) In Book 2 come the Egyptians, with their architectural immensities, their crocodiles, and their mummified pets, a nation whose curiosities are so numerous that the entire book is devoted to its history, culture, and monuments. In Book 3, the Persians come up against the Ethiopians, who (Herodotus has heard) are the tallest and most beautiful of all peoples. In Book 4, we get the mysterious, nomadic Scythians, who cannily use their lack of “civilization” to confound their would-be overlords: every time the Persians set up a fortified encampment, the Scythians simply pack up their portable dwellings and leave.

By the time of Darius’ reign, Persia had become something that had never been seen before: a multinational empire covering most of the known world, from India in the east to the Aegean Sea in the west and Egypt in the south. The real hero of Herodotus’ Histories, as grandiose, as admirable yet doomed, as any character you get in Greek tragedy, is Persia itself.

What gives this tale its unforgettable tone and character—what makes the narrative even more leisurely than the subject warrants—are those infamous, looping digressions: the endless asides, ranging in length from one line to an entire book (Egypt), about the flora and fauna, the lands and the customs and cultures, of the various peoples the Persian state tried to absorb. And within these digressions there are further digressions, an infinite regress of fascinating tidbits whose apparent value for “history” may be negligible but whose power to fascinate and charm is as strong today as it so clearly was for the author, whose narrative modus operandi often seems suspiciously like free association. Hence a discussion of Darius’ tax-gathering procedures in Book 3 leads to an attempt to calculate the value of Persia’s annual tribute, which leads to a discussion of how gold is melted into usable ingots, which leads to an inquiry into where the gold comes from (India), which, in turn (after a brief detour into a discussion of what Herodotus insists is the Indian practice of cannibalism), leads to the revelation of where the Indians gather their gold dust. Which is to say, from piles of sand rich in gold dust, created by a species of—what else?—“huge ants, smaller than dogs but larger than foxes.” (In this case, at least, Herodotus’ guides weren’t necessarily pulling his leg: in 1996, a team of explorers in northern Pakistan discovered that a species of marmot throws up piles of gold-rich earth as it burrows.)

One reason that what often looks like narrative Rorschach is so much fun to read is Herodotus’ style. Since ancient times, all readers of Herodotus, whatever their complaints about his reliability, have acknowledged him as a master prose stylist. Four centuries after Herodotus died, Cicero wondered rhetorically “what was sweeter than Herodotus.” In Herodotus’ own time, it’s worth remembering, the idea of “beautiful prose” would have been a revolutionary one: the ancient Greeks considered prose so debased in comparison to verse that they didn’t even have a word for it until decades after the historian wrote, when they started referring to it simply as psilos logos, “naked language,” or pedzos logos, “walking language” (as opposed to the dancing, or even airborne, language of poetry). Herodotus’ remarkable accomplishment was to incorporate, in extended prose narrative, the fluid rhythms familiar from the earlier, oral culture of Homer and Hesiod. The lulling cadences and hypnotically spiralling clauses in each of his sentences—which replicate, on the microcosmic level, the ambling, appetitive nature of the work as a whole—suggest how hard Herodotus worked to bring literary artistry, for the first time, to prose. One twentieth-century translator of the Histories put it succinctly: “Herodotus’s prose has the flexibility, ease and grace of a man superbly talking.”

All the more unfortunate, then, that this and pretty much every other sign of Herodotus’ prose style is absent from “The Landmark Herodotus,” whose new translation, by Andrea L. Purvis, is both naked and pedestrian. A revealing example is her translation of the Preface, which, as many scholars have observed, cannily appropriates the high-flown language of Homeric epic to a revolutionary new project: to record the deeds of real men in real historical time. In the original, the entire Preface is one long, winding, quasi-poetic sentence, a nice taste of what’s to come; Purvis chops it into three flat-footed sections. Readers who want a real taste of Herodotean style can do a lot worse than the 1858 translation of George Rawlinson (Everyman’s Library; $25), which beautifully captures the text’s rich Homeric flavor and dense syntax; more recently, the 1998 translation by Robin Waterfield (Oxford World’s Classics; $10.95) loses the archaic richness but, particularly in the opening, gives off a whiff of the scientific milieu out of which the Histories arose.

But in almost every other way “The Landmark Herodotus” is an ideal package for this multifaceted work. Much thought has been given to easing the reader’s journey through the narrative: running heads along the top of each page provide the number of the book, the year and geographical location of the action described, and a brief description of that action. (“A few Athenians remain in the Acropolis.”) Particularly helpful are notes running down the side of each page, each one comprising a short gloss on the small “chapters” into which Herodotus’ text is traditionally divided. Just skimming these is a good way of getting a quick tour of the vast work: “The Persians hate falsehoods and leprosy but revere rivers”; “The Taurians practice human sacrifice with Hellenes and shipwreck survivors”; “The story of Artemisia, and how she cleverly evades pursuit by ramming a friendly ship and sinking it, leading her pursuer to think her a friendly ship or a defector.” And “The Landmark Herodotus” not only provides the most thorough array of maps of any edition but is also dense with illustrations and (sometimes rather amateurish) photographs—a lovely thing to have in a work so rich in vivid descriptions of strange lands, objects, and customs. In this edition, Herodotus’ description of the Egyptians’ fondness for pet cats is paired with a photograph of a neatly embalmed feline.

For all the ostensible detours, then, the first four and a half books of the Histories lay a crucial foundation for the reader’s experience of the war between Persia and Greece. The latter is not the “real” story that Herodotus has to tell, saddled with a ponderous, if amusing, preamble, but, rather, the carefully prepared culmination of a tale that grows organically from the distant origins of Persia’s expansionism to its unimaginable defeat. In the light of this structure, it is increasingly evident that Herodotus’ real subject is not so much the improbable Greek victory as the foreordained Persian defeat. But why foreordained? What, exactly, did the Persian empire do wrong?

The answer has less to do with some Greek sense of the inevitability of Western individualism triumphing over Eastern authoritarianism—an attractive reading to various constituencies at various times—than it does with the scientific milieu out of which Herodotus drew his idea of historiē. For Herodotus, the Persian empire was, literally, “unnatural.” He was writing at a moment of great intellectual interest in the difference between what we today (referring to a similarly fraught cultural debate) call “nature vs. nurture,” and what the Greeks thought of as the tension between physis, “nature,” and nomos, “custom” or “law” or “convention.” Like other thinkers of his time, he was particularly interested in the ways in which natural habitat determined cultural conventions: hence the many so-called “ethnographic” digressions.

This is why, with certain exceptions, he seems, perhaps surprisingly to us, to view the growth of the Persian empire as more or less organic, more or less “natural”—at least, until it tries to exceed the natural boundaries of the Asian continent. A fact well known to Greek Civ students is that the word barbaros, “barbarian,” did not necessarily have the pejorative connotations that it does for us: barbaroi were simply people who didn’t speak Greek and whose speech sounded, to Greek ears, like bar-bar-bar. So it’s suggestive that one of the very few times in the Histories that Herodotus uses “barbarian” in our sense is when he’s describing Xerxes’ behavior at the Hellespont. As the classicist James Romm argues, in his lively short study “Herodotus” (Yale; $25), for this historian there is something inherently wrong and bad with the idea of trying to bleed over the boundaries of one continent into another. It’s no accident that the account of the career of Cyrus, the empire’s founder, is filled with pointed references to his heedless treatment of rivers, the most natural of boundaries. (Cyrus dies, in fact, after ill-advisedly crossing the river Araxes, considered a boundary between Asia and Europe.)

What’s wrong with Persia, then, isn’t its autocratic form of government but its size, which in the grand cycle of things is doomed one day to be diminished. Early in the Histories, Herodotus makes reference to the way in which cities and states rise and fall, suddenly giving an ostensibly natural principle a moralizing twist:




I shall . . . proceed with the rest of my story recounting cities both lesser and greater, since many of those that were great long ago have become inferior, and some that are great in my own time were inferior before. And so, resting on my knowledge that human prosperity never remains constant, I shall make mention of both without discrimination.



The passage suggests that, both for states and for individuals, a coherent order operates in the universe. In this sense, history turns out to be not so different from that other great Greek invention—tragedy. The debt owed by Herodotus to Athenian tragedy, with its implacable trajectories from grandeur to abjection, has been much commented on by classicists, some of whom even attribute his evolution from a mere note-taker to a grand moralist of human affairs to the years spent in Athens, when he is said to have been a friend of Sophocles. (As one scholar has put it, “Athens was his Damascus.”)

Athens itself, of course, was to become the protagonist of one such tragico-historical “plot”: during Herodotus’ lifetime, the preëminent Greek city-state travelled a Sophoclean road from the heady triumph of the Persian Wars to the onset of the Peloponnesian War, a conflict during which it lost both its political and its moral authority. This is why it’s tempting to think, with certain classical historians, that the Histories were composed as a kind of friendly warning about the perils of imperial ambition. If the fate of the Persians could be intended as an object lesson for the Athenians, Herodotus’ ethical point is much larger than the superiority of the West to the East.

Only a sense of the cosmic scale of Herodotus’ moral vision, of the way it grafts the political onto the natural schema, can make sense of his distinctive style, of all the seemingly random detours and diversions—the narrative equivalents of the gimcrack souvenirs and brightly colored guidebooks and the flowered shirts. If you wonder, at the beginning of the story of Persia’s rise, whether you really need twenty chapters about the distant origins of the dynasty to which Croesus belongs, think again: that famous story of how Croesus’ ancestor Gyges assassinated the rightful king and took the throne (to say nothing of the beautiful queen) provides information that allows you to fit Croesus’ miserable ending into the natural scheme of things. His fall, it turns out, is the cosmic payback for his ancestor’s crime: “Retribution would come,” Herodotus says, quoting the Delphic oracle, “to the fourth descendant of Gyges.”

These neat symmetries, you begin to realize, turn up everywhere, as a well-known passage from Book 3 makes clear:




Divine providence in its wisdom created all creatures that are cowardly and that serve as food for others to reproduce in great numbers so as to assure that some would be left despite the constant consumption of them, while it has made sure that those animals which are brutal and aggressive predators reproduce very few offspring. The hare, for example, is hunted by every kind of beast, bird, and man, and so reproduces prolifically. Of all animals, she is the only one that conceives while she is already pregnant. . . . But the lioness, since she is the strongest and boldest of animals, gives birth to only one offspring in her entire life, for when she gives birth she expels her womb along with her young. . . . Likewise, if vipers and the Arabian winged serpents were to live out their natural life spans, humans could not survive at all.



For Herodotus, virtually everything can be assimilated into a kind of natural cycle of checks and balances. (In the case of the vipers and snakes he refers to, the male is killed by the female during copulation, but the male is “avenged” by the fact that the female is killed by her young.) Because his moral theme is universal, and because his historical “plot” involves a world war, Herodotus is trying to give you a picture of the world entire, of how everything in it is, essentially, linked.

“Link,” as it happens, is not a bad word to have in mind as you make your way through a text that is at once compellingly linear and disorientingly tangential. He pauses to give you information, however remotely related, about everything he mentions, and that information can take the form of a three-thousand-word narrative or a one-line summary. It only looks confusing or “digressive” because Herodotus, far from being an old fuddy-duddy, not nearly as sophisticated as (say) Thucydides, was two and a half millennia ahead of the technology that would have ideally suited his mentality and style. It occurs to you, as you read “The Landmark Herodotus”—with its very Herodotean footnotes, maps, charts, and illustrations—that a truly adventurous new edition of the Histories would take the digressive bits and turn them into what Herodotus would have done if only they’d existed: hyperlinks.

Then again, Herodotus’ work may have presaged another genre altogether. The passage about lions, hares, and vipers reminds you of the other great objection to Herodotus—his unreliability. (For one thing, nearly everything he says about those animals is wrong.) And yet, as you make your way through this amazing document, “accuracy”—or, at least, what we normally think of as scientific or even journalistic accuracy, “the facts”—seems to get less and less important. Did Xerxes really weep when he reviewed his troops? Did the aged, corrupt Hippias, the exiled tyrant of Athens now in the service of Darius, really lose a tooth on the beach at Marathon before the great battle began, a sign that he interpreted (correctly) to mean that he would never take back his homeland? Perhaps not. But that sudden closeup, in which the preparations for war focus, with poignant suddenness, on a single hopeless old has-been, has indelible power. Herodotus may not always give us the facts, but he unfailingly supplies something that is just as important in the study of what he calls ta genomena ex anthrōpōn, or “things that result from human action”: he gives us the truth about the way things tend to work as a whole, in history, civics, personality, and, of course, psychology. (“Most of the visions visiting our dreams tend to be what one is thinking about during the day.”)

All of which is to say that while Herodotus may or may not have anticipated hypertext, he certainly anticipated the novel. Or at least one kind of novel. Something about the Histories, indeed, feels eerily familiar. Think of a novel, written fifty years after a cataclysmic encounter between Europe and Asia, containing both real and imagined characters, and expressing a grand vision of the way history works in a highly tendentious, but quite plausible, narrative of epic verve and sweep. Add an irresistible anti-hero eager for a conquest that eludes him precisely because he understands nothing, in the end, about the people he dreams of subduing; a hapless yet winning indigenous population that, almost by accident, successfully resists him; and digressions powerfully evoking the cultures whose fates are at stake in these grand conflicts. Whatever its debt to the Ionian scientists of the sixth century B.C. and to Athenian tragedy of the fifth, the work that the Histories may most remind you of is “War and Peace.”

And so, in the end, the contemporary reader is likely to come away from this ostensibly archaic epic with the sense of something remarkably familiar, even contemporary. That cinematic style, with its breathtaking wide shots expertly alternating with heart-stopping closeups. The daring hybrid genre that integrates into a grand narrative both flights of empathetic fictionalizing and the anxious, footnote-prone self-commentary of the obsessive, perhaps even neurotic amateur scholar. (To many readers, the Histories may feel like something David Foster Wallace could have dreamed up.) A postmodern style that continually calls attention to the mechanisms of its own creation and peppers a sprawling narrative with any item of interest, however tangentially related to the subject at hand.

Then, there is the story itself. A great power sets its sights on a smaller, strange, and faraway land—an easy target, or so it would seem. Led first by a father and then, a decade later, by his son, this great power invades the lesser country twice. The father, so people say, is a bland and bureaucratic man, far more temperate than the son; and, indeed, it is the second invasion that will seize the imagination of history for many years to come. For although it is far larger and more aggressive than the first, it leads to unexpected disaster. Many commentators ascribe this disaster to the flawed decisions of the son: a man whose bluster competes with, or perhaps covers for, a certain hollowness at the center; a leader who is at once hobbled by personal demons (among which, it seems, is an Oedipal conflict) and given to grandiose gestures, who at best seems incapable of comprehending, and at worst is simply incurious about, how different or foreign his enemy really is. Although he himself is unscathed by the disaster he has wreaked, the fortunes and the reputation of the country he rules are seriously damaged. A great power has stumbled badly, against all expectations.

Except, of course, the expectations of those who have read the Histories. If a hundred generations of men, from the Athenians to ourselves, have learned nothing from this work, whose apparent wide-eyed naïveté conceals, in the end, an irresistible vision of the way things always seem to work out, that is their fault and not the author’s. Time always tells, as he himself knew so well. However silly he may once have looked, Herodotus, it seems, has had the last laugh. ♦

ART: ADRIEN GUIGNET, “XERXES AT THE HELLESPONT” (1845)/AKG-IMAGES

30.7.08

Homogenious World (Tant pis!)

A trip to India once meant a saffron-scented experience of the exotic. Today, going to Bangalore means a trip to a First World city built on modern technology. Business travelers can fly from Chicago to Shanghai and experience a pretty homogenous world of identically furnished high-rise offices and business hotels and frequent flyer clubs. And you can always get your preferred breakfast beverage: The sun never sets on the Starbucks mermaid.




But the flat world experienced by the globe-trotting management consultant is only the wealthiest and most air-conditioned sliver of the globe. Harm de Blij's new book, "The Power of Place" (Oxford University Press, 280 pages, $27.95), reminds us that our planet is still a remarkably diverse globe filled with poverty as well as prosperity. In some ways, the differences across space have only increased over time.

Place is powerful indeed. People born in America or Europe are much more likely to end up wealthy and healthy than people born in the developing world. Life expectancy in Sweden and Japan is over 80, while life expectancy in Zimbabwe is under 45. The success of New York reflects the power of place to foment creativity and productivity by speeding the flow of ideas.

In his book, Mr. de Blij addresses some of the most fundamental questions in geography: Are differences across space man-made or nature's handiwork? Is globalization homogenizing the world, and is that a good thing? Should political power be held by large nation states or devolved to smaller geographic units?

Mr. de Blij sagely steers a middle ground through all of these old debates. He doesn't give us a one-sided case for geographic determinism or a wholesale attack on globalization. Instead, "The Power of Place" offers a thoughtful, balanced, and meandering tour of the diversity of human geography.

For all its explanatory power, geographic determinism does have some clear limits. It can provide at best a partial explanation for the variety of language and religion, which is the heart and soul of cultural diversity. As much as anything else, our religious beliefs and our languages are formed socially, through interactions with the people around us. Certainly, no aspects of physical landscape can explain why 71% of Americans, but only 11% of Danes, believe in the devil. These beliefs do not reflect the temperature or trade winds or soil of the two countries. Religious beliefs, like language, reflect what we learn from our parents and peers and preachers and teachers.

But nature is far less innocent in the geography of health. Malaria has been pushed back toward the tropics, but there it remains, killing millions in the climates that are kindest to its carriers. Great tsunamis and hurricanes continue to kill thousands on low-lying coastal areas. Volcanoes threaten Tokyo and Seattle. Man can make naturally dangerous places a little safer, but there is no doubt that natural geography matters.

Mr. de Blij takes the sensible center on the connection between globalization and diversity. Increasing connections between people are reducing the amount of linguistic diversity, but religious heterogeneity, especially of the extreme sort, doesn't appear to be declining. Global inequality is falling as the once-poor nations of India and China become wealthier, but income inequality within and across nations is rising. (The gains of India and China, among several other fast-developing economies, more than make up for growing inequality elsewhere, in statistical terms.) Within America, the heterogeneity of real estate prices and education levels across metropolitan areas is rising, but racial segregation is falling.

Mr. de Blij also occupies a middle ground on the benefits of globalization. He hopes that more people will get access to the economic opportunities in the developed world, but he also regrets the loss of cultural and linguistic diversity that accompanies this process. I'm less worried about declining linguistic variety than he is but, then again, Mr. de Blij seems to know six languages well; I'm stuck with my grammatically imperfect English, and my linguistically limited perspective makes me pretty enthusiastic about the spread of English.

I am more prone to share Mr. de Blij's concerns about other adverse consequences of connection. Increasing global connectedness has brought disease, warfare, and terrorism across oceans and continents. We should not turn away from globalization or immigration because of the costs of connection, but we should, at least, acknowledge those costs.

Mr. de Blij also persists in seeing both sides of the case for giving power to subnational provinces. He is right to do so. There is much to admire about systems that allow for regional diversity, but regional governments often exacerbate regional hostility and fail to provide for larger public goods, such as defense or redistribution.

Mr. de Blij's vast reach and steady even-handedness make "The Power of Place" an enjoyable, intellectual stroll. If the author has one overarching theme, it is to remind his readers that much of the world is still suffering with poverty and disease. That fact is always worth remembering.

Mr. Glaeser is the Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard, director of the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.

29.7.08

Marriage

Till death does the confusion last.

Can anyone, in or out of a marriage, explain what it is? Many think of it as the mystical melting of two people, a man and a woman, into "one flesh." (Try not to visualize Sir Paul and Heather, or Christie and Peter.)

Romantic or ridiculous?

Many also think of it as a contract between the same two kinds of people, in which both retain individual rights and absorb new obligations, with no unified being in sight. (Call it the "melting not" theory.)

More romantic, or a lawyer's idea of love?

David Levy, author of Love and Sex With Robots: The Evolution of Human-Robot Relations (HarperCollins, 2007), predicts we'll eventually pick partners who require real rather than metaphorical battery recharges. Some in the animal-rights movement doubtless expect discerning humans before long to get hitched to Fido or Jezebel. (This is serious. If Leona Helmsley could leave billions to dogs, wouldn't an evolved Leona-type down the line marry a dog with billions?)

Such is the vaunted social institution that gays in the United States struggle to enter (with notable recent success), that hordes of evangelicals and Christians hit the barricades to "defend," that heterosexuals increasingly flee, as indicated by the U.S. Census finding in 2000 that the "most common household type in the U.S." is now "people living alone."

If professional philosophers did their jobs, analyzed concrete philosophical problems, and won media attention for their conclusions, we wouldn't be sentenced to the cable simplicities of right-wing marriage pundits, or the often ahistorical rights-focused arguments of same-sex-marriage champions. We'd be forced to think hard about what marriage has been, is, and should be, before deciding to whom we're willing to sell tickets.

That's not our culture today, so we're lucky Frances E. Dolan, a professor of English at the University of California at Davis, steeped herself in the history, brought along a philosopher's antennae for blunt contradiction, and produced Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). Oh, how the quality of debate on same-sex marriage would improve if activists on the subject, candidates, and officials sat down to read it! Maybe it can be tossed out, like a bouquet, anywhere such players meet.

Dolan's in-your-face introduction takes the usual, saccharine apotheosis of marriage in American culture, illustrated by Christian conservative James C. Dobson's description of it in Marriage Under Fire as "the very foundation of human social order," and turns it upside down. Marriage may be historic, Dolan concedes, "but its history is one of constant, constitutive crisis and conflict." As a result, she writes, "the legacy of marriage is a burdensome one."

For Dolan, who works in the scholarly tradition revitalized by Lawrence Stone's classic The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England: 1500-1800 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), "conflict between incompatible models and irreconcilable expectations is the history of marriage." She rejects the standard story that marriage has moved from "patriarchal to companionate, from obedience to intimacy, from sacrament to contract."

None of those transitions fully took place, she writes — indeed, they've "stalled." Rather, we have "inherited three models of marriage from early modern England (1550-1700): marriage as hierarchy, as fusion, and as contract. These three models are incompatible and, to make matters worse, each is riddled with internal contradictions."

With painstaking scholarly attention, Dolan shows that, but not without situating her tale in a broader context. She scrutinizes Adam and Eve and their legacy. She compares marriage-advice manuals in early modern England with today's wonderfully named successors: marvels like James Walker's Husbands Who Won't Lead and Wives Who Won't Follow, Douglas J. Brouwer's Beyond "I Do," Elisabeth Elliot's Let Me Be a Woman, and Gary Smalley's Hidden Keys of a Loving Lasting Marriage.

More rigorously, Dolan dissects influential literary works such as Shakespeare's The Taming of the Shrew and Noel Coward's Private Lives, and ponders provocative modern movies such as Sleeping With the Enemy (1991) and Enough (2002). She provides a masterly overview of both scholarly and fictional depictions of Anne Boleyn and Elizabeth I in relation to the marriage models of their time. Synthesizing all that, Dolan reaches conclusions that make the single life positively appealing and back her view that we must reconceive marriage "so that it has more room for whatever persons enter into it."

At the core of Dolan's thinking is the insight that even when we leave aside internal contradictions between models of marriage, each version presents intractable problems. The "fusion into one" conceit, notoriously absorbed into law through the fiction of "coverture" that made a husband the controller of his wife's rights, ignores the reality of distinct personalities with distinct goals. The "contract between equals" vision of companions and partners confronts religious, legal, and popular traditions that associate "equality with conflict," and hold that "once spouses confront one another as equals only one can win the resulting battles."

In Dolan's view, marriage rests on an "economy of scarcity" in regard to rights and privileges "in which there is only room for one full person." The traditional solution? Marriage "as a hierarchy in which someone, usually the husband, has to be the boss." On this view, "hierarchy resolves conflict while equality promotes it," an assumption that Dolan says underpins "many conceptualizations of marriage."

It's here that Dolan insinuates her most provocative idea — that marriage, by its confused nature, amounts to a form of "violence" against individuality, sometimes prompting other forms as well. At first blush, the notion sounds extremist. Yet Dolan makes sense of it. She hardly lacks examples of the more gory violence long associated with marriages gone terribly bad. But her perspective often proves most impressive not when she's revisiting women burned at the stake for actually murdering their husbands, but identifying a whole tradition of women diarists who fantasized their husbands' deaths as the only way out of captivity.

Dolan devotes only two pages to same-sex marriage, but the implications of her study for it are immense. Though plainly sympathetic to the idea on equality grounds, Dolan suggests that married gay people will confront many of the lingering biases of the "economy of scarcity" model — its presumption that one marriage partner must be privileged, its tendency to concentrate "entitlements and capacities in one spouse" until "that spouse absorbs, subordinates, or eliminates the other." Without the signposts of biological difference, how will the courts know who's who in gay marriages?

Dolan ventures no opinion. But Marriage and Violence forces a bigger issue into the policy limelight where gay marriage now finds itself. The book's incisive, detailed attention to abundant aspects of matrimony makes one realize that scholarship on marriage as a historical institution must be part of the nationwide debate on gay marriage. We need to contemplate, in a new light, those challenging concrete elements — the ownership symbolism of the ring, the wife's traditional taking of the husband's surname, so-called male "headship" in marriage generally, intercourse as a "conjugal debt," prenuptial agreements, wifely submission as subterfuge, the psychological subtleties that criminal law must confront in assessing battered women.

Until now, most media have taken the "marriage" half of "same-sex marriage" for granted. That's a recipe for more of the simplistic discussions we've heard so far. Dolan rightly seeks to "denaturalize" our clichéd conception of marriage by explaining its historical development. In that spirit, she makes clear that while she can't devote desirable space to such rich traditions as Jewish and Muslim marriage in her largely Protestant-driven narrative, they too, and their idiosyncrasies, must be part of any sophisticated conversation about the subject.

In the meantime, Dolan and the marriage scholars she ably represents and cites — such thinkers and inspired researchers as Nancy F. Cott, David Cressy, Alison D. Wall, and Stone — offer a further message to conservative opponents of same-sex marriage. If they truly understood the institution's history, they might fall to their knees and thank God that gay people want anything to do with such a conceptual mess.

Carlin Romano, critic at large for The Chronicle Review and literary critic for The Philadelphia Inquirer, teaches philosophy and media theory at the University of Pennsylvania.

Preparing to "Live"

I once knew a partner at a large firm who told me this: "I can stand what I'm doing right now, because I'm going to retire at 55."

"And then what?" I asked.

"I'm going to live my own life for a change." Her eyes glistened for a moment on her otherwise exhausted face.

"And how many years away is that?"

"Eighteen," she said, her voice sinking.

"And when you are living your own life, what will you do?"

She looked at me with a mixture of bewilderment and sadness before she finally said in a low voice, "I don't really know, but I'm sure it will come to me."

"When you were a freshman in college, what did you want to grow up to be?" I asked.

Immediately, she said, "I was an English major. I wanted to be a fiction writer."

"Do you write fiction now?" I already knew the answer that would come.

"I don't have time," she said.

I once knew an executive who checked his portfolios and balances daily, constantly calculating and re-calculating the value of his house, the reserves he would need in the coming years to sustain his lifestyle, how much longer he had to "earn an income," and on and on.

I asked him what he wanted to talk about with me. He said, "I hate my life."

"Why?" I asked.

"I am so busy worrying about retirement -- I can't relax."

"Is there anything about your life the way it is right now that you like -- that feels rewarding? What are your passions?"

He stared at me for a long moment before saying, "No ... nothing comes to mind."

I am sure the reader knows individuals who are caught in this bind, or perhaps the reader knows she is in this bind. It is a common condition, causing great amounts of suffering, depression, anxiety and medication. I call it Preparing to Live Syndrome (PtLS).

The sufferer sees life as an endless chain of meaningless, two-dimensional experiences that lack passion, value or meaning but that he must tolerate, because those experiences lead to some future point when all will come together, and life will again take on sparkle and value. In the meantime, there is nothing the sufferer can do, and the solution always lies out of reach, in the future.

Of course, there is no recognized PtLS. It is my own coinage. But it is one I have much experience with -- and not just in clients but in myself. This is because PtLS is deeply embedded in modern Western culture. It is common for Americans to live in some degree of regret about the past and in some degree of uncertainty about the future. However uncertain most people are about the future, few would surrender their hold on it.

Weird, isn't it?

It is uncommon to focus attention on the here and now and recognize it for what it is: the one moment of the only life we will ever have that we truly possess. Rare is the individual who has come to completely accept that the past is no more than a memory and the future an assumption about unborn events.

What is left when we truly accept this? I would submit that the vast freedom of here and now is what's left. I am not the first to make this assertion; it has been one of the central claims of many spiritual-practice traditions for millennia. However, many people repeatedly encounter this notion and ignore it, muttering to themselves they don't have time for such folly.

To assume that one doesn't have time to grasp the one moment truly in her possession is to fall prey to the fallacy that there are an endless stream of such moments going on and on into the future, only to be seized when the time is right. Nothing could be further from the truth, of course.

This assumption about the unbrokenness of our lives leads people into the PtLS trap, in which we trade what we truly have for what does not yet -- and may never -- exist. Then, living in barely registered pain, many search for relief in addiction, pay raises and promotions and all manner of frantic behavior.

NO POSTPONEMENTS

How would today's lawyer, living and working in an environment whose very promises and foundations are in many ways built on PtLS, begin to step away from that line of thinking and more fully into the life he is living?

He can begin with this, a promise to himself: "Today is the only day that belongs to me; I will live it the best way I know how."

What could that mean? It could mean that when working, he will give full attention to the work, doing it as well as possible. It will also mean that he will make time not to work -- to do something pleasurable, not numbing or distracting but pleasurable, such as dropping into a partner's office to say hello and ask about the kids.

It will mean taking a few moments in a quiet office with the doors closed and phones off to stare out the window and notice the city lights.

It will mean beginning to scratch out the stories that have been waiting for a far-off retirement to get written, in whatever moments of solitude he can grab from the day's schedule.

It will mean touching a son's head, taking a daughter for a trip to the hardware store, holding a spouse for extra moments before leaving in the morning, and saying, "Hi, how are you?" to a secretary upon arrival.

It will mean taking your foot just slightly off the gas pedal, remembering that wherever it is you think you are going, you have, in fact, already arrived.

James Dolan, M.A., is a professional coach and psychotherapist with 30 years of experience in private practice in the Dallas area. He works with lawyers and physicians in improving their business development communications, internal relations and leadership and client-patient retention. His e-mail address is dolan.james@sbcglobal.net.

28.7.08

Silver Swingers

You can see him sitting in one of the massage chairs in Toni & Guy, the trendy and expensive hairdressers, waiting to have his silver locks layered and his straggly eyebrows trimmed. He should, by rights, patronise a barber more appropriate to his age – say, Trumper of Curzon Street – but the girls in Toni & Guy make an agreeable fuss around him, and the vibrating chair does wonders for the chronic ache in his spine.


You can see him at the Latitude Festival with his teenage family and his 36-year-old second wife, in her yellow Hunter gumboots and Comme des Garçons jacket. They wouldn't dream of missing Latitude; so much more civilised than Glastonbury, and you can see Bill Bailey and Hanif Kureishi rather than listen to guitar bands all day. He has, after all, been listening to guitars since he was 12 (he watched The Rolling Stones and The Beatles on the first-ever Top of the Pops in 1964) and has played several versions of the instrument since he was 16.

You can see him dropping off his seven-year-old son at day-school in Highgate. The young school-run mothers look at his mass of crow's-feet, his close-cropped white hair, his zip-fronted Reiss jacket with epaulettes, Banana Republic stone chinos and Oliver Sweeney brogues and think: this guy is Orlando's grandfather, isn't he?

You can see him at the Holmes Place gymnasium wearing a T-shirt and Fat Face surfer shorts, pounding along on the running machine with his eyes shut, iPod wires trailing from his ears. His face is taut with concentration. He could be a well-preserved 40. Only the fact that his T-shirt bears the legend "Emerson, Lake & Palmer 1974" gives away the fact that he is, in fact, 60.

He doesn't like the fact that his gym offers a "special rate" for 55-year-olds and over. He wasn't crazy about the way Saga magazine came crashing uninvited through his letter box on his 50th birthday, but he's used to it now (you put up with the adverts for stairlifts and inflatable bath seats to get the interviews with Patti Boyd and Julie Christie).

He objects to being on a mailing list that sends him impertinent correspondence about retirement benefits. He has no plans to retire, ever, thank you very much. Although if he did, it would leave him more time for playing Guitar Hero 3 on his PlayStation and thrashing his son by being note-perfect on "Smack My Bitch Up". He really really hates it when some well-meaning youth offers him a seat on the 9.03pm to Victoria.

He is, in short, one of the Groovy Old Men, an urban phenomenon that's been making its presence apparent since the turn of the millennium and now stretches across all breeds and types of hombre. Age-wise, the younger GOM are in their mid-to-late fifties (think Gabriel Byrne or Trevor Eve), they flourish in their early sixties (think Bryan Ferry and Sir Paul Smith), they become terribly distinguished in their mid-seventies (think Terence Conran and Peter Blake), and can still be found cutting a dash in their eighties (think Sir David Attenborough.) Beyond that, things get a little problematic, because of the awkward manifestations of decrepitude, and they start to disappear from view, their life's work complete.

They are cool, soigné, well groomed, well dressed. They knew about The Last Shadow Puppets before their children had heard of them, and pulled strings to get tickets to The Dark Knight at the IMAX. They worry about their health, and the environment, but not to a boring degree. They ride a Norton motorbike. They're very hard to pin down, age-wise.

The most visible Groovy Old Men may be rock and film stars, writers and public intellectuals, but they're by no means all media chatterers. They can be Paul, the chap who rewires your kitchen. Paul wears tight black jeans (at 59, he's very proud of his 34-inch waist) and has installed a thunderous 50-inch home cinema in his new, post-divorce, Southwark flat, confident that a blast of the knife-fight scene from V for Vendetta will impress lady callers enough for them to ignore the evidence of age in his strangely ochrous teeth.

Whoever he is, the Groovy Old Man is hellishly busy. At his age, he's less in mortgage hell than his younger associates. He has more disposable income, and he disposes of it with abandon. His favourite clothes are black drape jackets by Versace, and coloured shirts by Etro. He can be found hovering in the basement at Liberty, especially at sale-time.

Driven by impetuous desires, he might ring Apsley, the cut-price dandy's favourite tailor in Pall Mall, to ask them to make him a suit like the midnight-blue chalk-stripe worn by Rafa Nadal's father during the Wimbledon final. He is the classic "£50 man" who thinks nothing of spending that sum on CDs and DVDs in a Saturday trip to HMV. (He aches for a box set of Mad Men Series 1.)

He is rather precious about what he eats and drinks. Reluctant to push a trolley around Waitrose (let alone Tesco or – shudder – Asda,) he buys meat on mail order from Donald Russell (who supplies the Queen) and Brown Cow Organics (whose steak is devoured by the top acts at Glastonbury.) He buys fruit, olive oil and vegetables from Ocado, and wine from Green & Blue in south London, or Berry Bros in St James's when he's feeling flush. He would never, ever, be seen dead on an allotment.

A man in thrall to visual and aural culture, an early adopter of fancy technology, he still finds the odd evening to read a well-reviewed new novel (he's currently struggling a little with Joseph O'Neill's Netherland.) But magazines bulk larger in his life. Though he doesn't spend half the year by a pool, he takes Condé Nast Traveller to read about scuba-diving in the Maldives and camel-trekking in Zanzibar. He cannot resist the sexy gadgetry on display in T3 magazine. And he is a devoted fan of The Word.

In many ways, The Word magazine is the GOM's best friend. Its tone of piss-taking intelligence and undimmed optimism for rock music is reassuring to the fiftysomething. It says: you may have become an ageing couch-potato, watching The Departed on DVD and playing the Guillemots on your Bose speakers, but we know you've still enough life in you to enjoy contemplating lives of flamboyant excess and arguing about which was the best and worst-ever screen aliens.

"I'm not sure our readers are clinging to their youth," says David Hepworth, co-founder of The Word with Mark Ellen. "The point is, they don't believe they've ever got old. They'll do what they like until they fall down. Women, for all sorts of body clock reasons, always know exactly how old they are; but men, in their own heads, are perennially 37. What's more, they're blessed with a magical ability to look in the mirror and disregard all the evidence to the contrary."

It's so horribly true. But the ageing groover has had one thing on his side in the last decade: the kids don't mock him any more for liking rock music, or wearing Carhartt jeans or even playing a Fender Stratocaster. He has been blessed by the erosion of the generation gap: he is allowed to play Interpol or Beirut on the car hi-fi, just as his teenage children can rediscover Led Zeppelin.

Hepworth finds technology to be the great age-leveller. "One of the reasons older men have proved so influential in music in the last 10 years is that, whereas the word used to be on the street, it's now travelling digitally, and a middle-aged man with full access to communication technology can know as much, if not more, than his kids. The early adopters of the iPod were blokes of 40 and over. It trickled down to the younger generation a lot later. Wherever there's a cool toy, there's a middle-aged man trying to devise a reason why he needs it."

The evolution of man from middle-aged salary-man into tragic old git used to be clearly signposted. His sex life packed up. He stopped buying clothes for himself. He ceased to take an interest in modern music, and bought box sets of old favourites. He developed a passion for gardening, or the bowling green. He drank less, and bought a home-brew kit from Boots. He went to bed at 10pm, in order not to snooze through work afternoons. He would not welcome the prospect of a camping holiday.

In Shakespeare's classic taxonomy of human life, "All the world's a stage," he turns from the fat-bellied judge – a man in the prime of life and wisdom – into a grotesque:

"The sixth age shifts

Into the lean and slipper'd

pantaloon,

With spectacles on nose, and

pouch on side,

His youthful hose well sav'd,

a world too wide,

For his shrunk shank, and his

big manly voice,

Turning again towards

childish treble, pipes

And whistles in his sound."

And then again, it doesn't. The Bard's "sixth age" has been re-classified as the Third Age – the period of maturity and creativity, when your children have almost flown the coop, when you become alert to your own mortality (a couple of people your age have died), and you want to try everything the world has to offer: books, music, technology, drugs, travel, sex, food. You would have tried them all before, but you didn't have the money (or your wife wouldn't let you).

The Third Age is predicated on the likelihood of your having a Fourth Age of allotment-prowling retirement – but that itself looks forward to a Fifth Age, presumably spent becalmed in a morphine-fuelled care home.

In the meantime, here come the Groovy Old Men, in their £120 Paul Smith shirts, their huge, converted warehouse apartments in Bermondsey, their iPods full of The Fratellis and Bloc Party alongside Springsteen and Dylan, their Gillette clippers for disposing of nasal and aural hair, their MySpace entries, their discreet trips to the chemist for Viagra, Cialis and "vitamin supplements," their insouciance before the raised eyebrows of women and the alarm of their offspring.

The Groovy Old Men started out as the children of post-war rock'n'roll, growing up in the Forties, Fifties and Sixties. They're probably the most fortunate generation in history. Lucky to have missed the war, most of them also missed rationing, national service and austerity. But they witnessed the initial stirrings of rock music – Elvis, Bill Haley, Cliff, Buddy – the benefits of the Pill, the apotheosis of the teenager, the rise of satire, the counterculture, the expansion of screen-based culture into the global village, the first wave of computers... No wonder Groovy Young Men turned out the way they did.

Their early role models are still pushing their luck. Mick Jagger, the Chanticleer of rock for 45 years, is an astonishing 65 this Saturday. It's a quarter-century since he memorably said: "I don't know of any rule that says you can't be 40 and stay up all night." Leonard Cohen, the gravelly bard of love and enlightenment, is the most lionised figure of the musical year, making young women tremble at his 73-year-old baritone. Neil Young, 63, knocked the crowd dead at the Hop Farm festival (my 16-year-old son said it was the best gig he'd ever attended) and has directed a documentary of his old pals/adversaries Crosby, Stills and Nash touring with him, playing songs from his Living with War album. Neil Diamond, Brian Wilson and Lou Reed came over to reassure British fans that they were capable of standing up unaided, and of singing like angels without seeming in any imminent danger of joining the Heavenly throng.

This summer has brought a rash of GOM misbehaviour. Ronnie Wood, 61, legged it to Ireland with a 19-year-old Russian cocktail waitress, until hauled home by his wife and son. John Cleese, 68, celebrated his ruinously expensive third divorce by stepping out with a blonde American dame of 34 (called Smiley), and Salman Rushdie, a world-class novelist seemingly afflicted with chronic satyriasis, got his 60-year-old arm around the waist of a beautiful twentysomething black writer called Aita.

"Just what is it about older men?" demanded an article in The Daily Telegraph. Sensing a trend, The Times has started a regular fashion-and-style column called "Mutton Dressed as Lad." This October, the trend-setting senior demographic gets its own style bible when Groovy Old Men by the radio producer Nick Baker (aged 56 this year) is published by Icon Books.

What is going on? Have we lost all sense of the behavioural conventions that come with age? "People used to think that when they got to middle age – which used to be about 40 – they had to behave a certain way, that society expected them to quieten down and have their pleasures in private, like Max Mosley," says the philosopher AC Grayling, 59. "I think that's gone, because those of us who were groovers in the Sixties, and kept on grooving, haven't wanted to grow up and become staid and set in our habits. We're trying to repudiate the idea that you have to think in a certain way just because the chronology dictates.

"All these horrible clichés, about 60 being the new 40 and so on, capture a really significant change in attitude. The next big thing, now that we've had racism and sexism, is ageism. The baby-boomer generation are looking at the prospect of having to retire and not wanting to. They're saying, 'We're fitter and healthier and richer than our parents were, we want to keep going, we got all this experience and knowledge, we know how to do things now, it's just that we're slightly less able to do them in a hurry.'"

One sign that the Groovy Old Men are winning the ageism war will be when men over 40 are seen in advertisements for objects of desire. Elsewhere in Europe, they're ahead of us: in Italy, Baldessarini perfume per uomo is marketed using the image of a suave Lothario – silver hair slicked back, silver chin-beard, cruel blue eyes – who will clearly never see 60 again but has a private jet, a lissom girlfriend and, evidently, a hell of a scent.

British companies have some way to go. They will have to convince British punters, as Groovy Old Men seek to persuade them every day, that there's more to life than counting the years.

"Philosophically speaking," says AC Grayling, "there's a long tradition of thinking that life isn't a matter of time, calibrated in seconds, minutes, hours and years, but measured in experience. You can have many lifetimes if you do lots of things, and feel lots, and respond lots; if you're open to endeavour and relationships, you can pack in many lifetimes.

"There's plenty to be done, and enjoyed and experienced at any age if you're got the health and the money – and more of us have both. I think we have a dramatically different view, now, of the shape of a human life. Its narrative sequence is potentially very different from what it used to be."

J. S.

On today's date in 1750, Johann Sebastian Bach, died in Leipzig. His worldly goods, including eight harpsichords and a valuable violin, were divided up between his wife and nine surviving children. But for posterity, the most valuable part of the estate were the piles and piles of manuscript scores of Bach's music. These, too, were divided up among the family. Miraculously, many have survived, but over time, many have also disappeared.

In 1850, to mark the centenary of the composer's death, the Bach Gesellschaft was founded in Leipzig to publish a complete edition of Bach's surviving works.

Fast-forward another hundred years or so, to 1945 . . .

World War II had just ended. Germany lay in ruins, and it was feared that one major German collection of yet-uncatalogued Bach family scores had been destroyed by Allied bombs. The collection had, in fact, been confiscated by a Red Army tank driver as war booty and sent by the KGB to a music conservatory in Kiev. There it stayed, unbeknownst to anyone in the West, until 1973, when the collection was transferred to another Soviet archive in the Ukraine.*

Tipped off by an East German librarian, Bach scholar Christoph Wolff tried for over twenty years to view this collection, and finally succeeded in the summer of 1999. Wolff didn't find any new works by J.S. Bach, but among the hundreds of manuscripts were unpublished pieces by Bach's two oldest sons, C.P.E. and Wilhelm Friedemann Bach.

Elitism in the Defense of the Best is no............

Elitism is not a dirty word
Categorizing 'the best' isn't confined to art; it plays out in sports, cinema, pop music and beyond.
By Mark Swed

EVERY NOW and then, writers at The Times lose a word. Mainly these are adjectives subject to misuse. Some years ago we were advised to let go of legendary. Similarly, don't expect to see iconic, which has become equally cheapened, in the paper much anymore.

The adjectival criminal I'd like to see handed over to the word police is elitist, especially in its relationship to the arts and popular culture. In the "elitist" Oxford English Dictionary, the first definition of "elite" is the "choice part, the best (of society, a group of people, etc.)," none of which sounds so terrible. But that is not what is meant when, say, classical music, my field, is scorned as elitist, as it regularly is.

One tack many of us in the arts choose is to proudly take back the word. "Hey, Bud, you got a problem with us being the best?" Of course, you do. The arts are seen as for the select few -- too expensive, too inaccessible, too chichi for the general public devoted to movies, pop music, television and sports.

In fact, the reverse can just as easily be true. Cinema and video and all kinds of music and even sports can, of course, be art -- or not. And the more popular something or someone is, the more likely elitism will occur. Google "rock god" -- which the supposedly non-elitist Urban Dictionary defines as "an artist that is so talented and amazing that he is worshiped as a god by his fans" (please note the "he") -- and you will have the option of spending the next several days running through a half-million results. Go for "classical music god" and you are blessed with free time, unless you wish to get hung up on such items as " . . . classical music (God, I hate the term). . . . "

A ticket to hear the Los Angeles Philharmonic in fancy-schmancy Walt Disney Concert Hall may not always be easy to come by at the last minute and top seats are now $147. But for most programs, bench seats behind the stage (which many love) go on sale two weeks before the concert for $15. Do I need to detail the princely sums in the thousands it takes to attend an NBA playoff? On Broadway, $400 tickets no longer raise eyebrows. At Disney, we are a democratic audience who sit together. In the supposedly populist Staples Center, luxury suites resemble nothing so much as the royal boxes in European opera houses of old. Anyone can go to an art museum, but not anyone can get past the bouncers at the latest in-crowd club.

Let's not even get into how the epithet "elitist" has sullied a lot of recent political attacks.

Breathing rarefied air

IN SPORTS, the best athletes are still known as the elite. Anyone who rides a bicycle knows that a cyclist able to wear the yellow jersey in the Tour de France is no mere mortal. And isn't the scandal about doping in the Tour really a scandal about elitism? Performance-enhancing substances may have side effects, but I suspect the real fear is that these drugs have the potential of making the rest of us better athletes and the pros less special.

But the argument is actually much more complicated and more interesting than that. The arts are both elitist and non-elitist, and so is popular culture.

I try to follow the Tour, which is witnessed by hundreds of thousands of fans who line the route over three weeks. This is an epic event and requires at least the time and effort of reading Homer. And explanations of ancient Greek mores are easier to come by (and I think comprehend) than the arcane Tour culture.

The other day I visited Amoeba Music with Times television critic Robert Lloyd, who performs in a rock band and is an authority on pop culture. I told him that these days, I felt as intimated by the pop section as people tell me they are by the classical department. He said that even he could no longer manage the amount of specialized knowledge that pop music now requires to have a full grasp of the field. Hip-hop and dub have become suitable for graduate level course work. Is that elitist or what?

On the other hand, some of the classical music that has been around for a century or two is simply in our cultural blood, having long ago instituted itself into film soundtracks and popular music. Sure, it helps to know a little something about it, just as you need to know a little something about baseball to enjoy a game. But elitism, in its pejorative sense, is a state of mind, not a cultural phenomenon.

26.7.08

Parsifal

On today's date in 1882, the first performance of Richard Wagner's new opera, "Parsifal" took place at the Bayreuth Festival in Bavaria. In the audience was a 25-year old American named Gustav Kobbé, an ardent opera fan who would go on to write "Kobbé's Complete Opera Book," a standard reference work on the subject still in print today.

But back in 1882, as Kobbé watched the opening scene of "Parsifal," his gaze became fixed on one spot of the painted scenery, depicting a pile of rocks. Was that Wagner's face painted on one of the rocks? Or was that Wagner himself, staring out at the singers on stage? During the intermission, Kobbé asked others if they had seen what he had, but they just looked at him as if he were crazy. Perhaps the heat of the Bavarian summer had affected the young American's brain, they suggested.

"I was beginning to think that the appearance of Wagner's face was a mirage, resulting from lights behind the scenes," wrote Kobbé. "I mentioned the matter to one of the singers in the cast. He manifested surprise, not at what I had discovered, but at my having discovered it." The singer told Kobbé that to insure that singers followed his specific directions where to stand and when to move, Wagner had, in fact, been standing on stage amid the painted rocks. To all eyes but Kobbé's, Wagner's craggy, sun-tanned face had blended in perfectly with the painted scenery.

Our Muddled Brains

Don't Believe Everything You Think : Six Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking (06 Edition)
by Thomas Kida

Two Books about Our Bungled Brains
A Review by Doug Brown



Our brains like to think they are flawless, unbiased masters of precision, but the reality is sadly not so. We form conclusions and beliefs with little or no reason and then seek evidence which supports the conclusions we've already reached. Our brains perceive the world in ways that make ourselves look better than others. Most people think they are above average in intelligence (and we think we're all better drivers than everyone else, too) which logically cannot be true. Thomas Kida and Cordelia Fine take on the brain with different approaches. Don't Believe Everything You Think is more about flaws in our ability to reason and recall, whereas A Mind of Its Own leans more toward emotional biases. Thus, the two books complement each other nicely.

Don't Believe Everything You Think is aimed at helping people to be more skeptical. Kida points out that skeptical doesn't mean cynical; it simply means analyzing the evidence before making up one's mind. It sounds simple, but as Kida (and Fine) detail, it runs counter to how our brains want to function. Here are Kida's six basic mistakes our brains make (this isn't giving anything away -- they are on the cover of the book):


We prefer stories to statistics
We seek to confirm, not to question our ideas
We rarely appreciate the role of chance and coincidence in shaping events
We sometimes misperceive the world around us
We tend to oversimplify our thinking
We have faulty memories

Kida cites many studies to support these notions, and provides many examples of how our brains want to take the easy road. Despite the potential for this being a dry pedagogical book, Don't Believe Everything You Think is well-organized and written in an easy, lucid style.
A Mind of Its Own is a breezier book. By the end of it you know quite a bit about Fine's home life, her relationship with her husband, and how she feels about writing a book while raising two kids. It creates a nice familiar tone, like having coffee with a friend who knows a lot about brain function. If you are a "just the facts, ma'am" person, you might wish for a bit more data and a bit less anecdote, but Fine also cites many studies in addition to her own stories. Each chapter covers a different fault of the brain, and the chapter names say it all: "The Vain Brain," "The Emotional Brain," "The Immoral Brain," "The Deluded Brain," "The Secretive Brain," "The Bigoted Brain," etc. Fine may seem a pessimist, but, as she put it, the evidence indicates that in many ways our brain, "...has a mind of its own. An adroit manipulator of information, it leaves us staring at a mere facade of reality. Vanity shields us from unpalatable truths about ourselves. Craven methods of moral bookkeeping also attentively serve the principle of self-glorification, often at others' expense." Still believe in Intelligent Design?

Many of the same studies are referenced in both books, like of course the Milgram shock experiments and Zimbardo's Stanford prison experiment. But the flow and aim of each book is different enough that there isn't a feeling of repetition. I recommend Don't Believe Everything You Think first, as it offers more tips on how to process information, and I'm an info sort of person. However, A Mind of Its Own is a perfect chaser, just in case you think that Kida's book covered all the ways our minds trip us up. Fine details lots of foibles to provide readers with the ability to recognize when our brains are getting ready to deceive us.

Happy Birthday Sir Michael!

Auden

About suffering they were never wrong,
The Old Masters: how well they understood
Its human position; how it takes place
While someone else is eating or opening a window or just walking
dully along;
How, when the aged are reverently, passionately waiting
For the miraculous birth, there always must be
Children who did not specially want it to happen, skating
On a pond at the edge of the wood:
They never forgot
That even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course
Anyhow in a corner, some untidy spot
Where the dogs go on with their doggy life and the torturer's horse
Scratches its innocent behind a tree.

In Breughel's Icarus, for instance: how everything turns away
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry,
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone
As it had to on the white legs disappearing into the green
Water; and the expensive delicate ship that must have seen
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,
Had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on.

"Musée des Beaux Arts" by W.H. Auden from W H Auden: The Collected Poems. ©

25.7.08

TEATIME

Love Me -- Love My Books

By Molly Flatt

Some books are so dear, so essential, that if a potential partner finds it risible, any meeting of the minds (or body) is impossible, writes Molly Flatt ...


For bibliophiles, books are relationship brokers. Whether discovering a mutual passion for Potter on a first date, bonding over the sensuality of 18th-century Japanese yomihon, or placing a suitably literary lonely hearts ad in the London Review of Books [2], our romantic encounters are often dominated by the books we love. And hate.

Opposite reading tastes certainly do attract. My boyfriend may think that Dostoyevsky plays baseball for the Mets, but as an eclectic reader, equally interested in Dick Francis as DeLillo, I relish challenges to my reading preferences and predilections. Rifts over books give partners a chance to redefine (and refine) what we like, and to explore personal differences. A little game of intellectual and aesthetic one-upmanship can be a very sexy thing.

However, I do believe in the dealbreaker book. This book so deeply resonates with your soul that if a potential partner finds it risible, any meeting of minds (or body) is all but impossible. Most of us have one or two books that encapsulate all we believe to be skilful and admirable in art and in life. And while we don't necessarily expect everyone to enjoy them, we do expect our soulmate to. Or at least respect them. Rachel Donadio at the New York Times explored this very issue in a lively essay [3] in March. She further proposed that "Brainy women are probably more sensitive to literary deal breakers than are brainy men. (Rare is the guy who'd throw a pretty girl out of bed for revealing her imperfect taste in books.)"

After all, women read more, especially when it comes to fiction. "It's really great if you find a guy that reads, period," said Beverly West, an author of "Bibliotherapy: The Girl's Guide to Books for Every Phase of Our Lives." Jessa Crispin, a blogger at the literary site Bookslut.com [4], agrees. "Most of my friends and men in my life are nonreaders," she said, but "now that you mention it, if I went over to a man's house and there were those books about life's lessons learned from dogs, I would probably keep my clothes on."

The NYT books blog Paper Cuts then asked readers "What are your literary dealbreakers--or literary deal-sealers?" [5] There are 404 comments so far.

Our dealbreaker book represents what we want to be--it is an exercise in literary self-actualisation. It is different from the unread tomes found on our Facebook profiles--the 'If You Don't Know Mulla Sadra's "Diwan Shi'r", You're Not Worth Knowing' status game we play. We have actually read and been moved by these books. And our fondness for them might well be embarrassing. But it doesn't matter whether it's Marian Keyes or Milan Kundera--there are books we fall in love with. At times they seem to evoke the best versions of ourselves (indeed, the version we perhaps hope appeals most to others). Our relationship with our favourite books is intimate, and something worth defending.

With a dealbreaker book, someone's breezy dismissal can feel worse than an active dislike. If the books we hold close so utterly chime with our own hopes and fears, so strongly capture an ideal of self and life and beauty, a failure to share these basic visions can suggest a profound mismatch. To remain unstirred by what a lover adores seemingly promises a bland future of belittled dreams and quiet dinners in Pizza Express.

My dealbreaker is Dorothy Dunnett's "House of Niccolo" series [6]. Yes, these novels have horses, medieval men and desert landscapes on their covers. Admittedly, being seen reading them sometimes makes me wish I could plaster my degree on the dust-jacket. But I would defend their scholarly curiosity, technical brilliance and humanity to the point of divorce. Perhaps this is narrow-minded and even a bit sad. Should fictional relationships ever really trump real flesh and blood?

It was definitely unfair for me to expect my boyfriend to wholeheartedly embrace my beloved copy of Elizabeth Knox's "The Vintner's Luck" [7], in which a pissed, gay, leather-trouser-wearing angel is sodomised by a French peasant (an acquired taste, perhaps). But I'm sure he'll love Dorothy, when he reads her. At least, I'm sure he'll say he does. "Love me, love my book" goes the deliciously childish refrain.

Molly Flatt is a writer in London.

Inequlities

Talking to the Plumber

The I.Q gap.

By John Derbyshire


The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
God made them, high or lowly,
And order'd their estate.

The 1982 Episcopal Hymnal omits that stanza, the second of Mrs. Alexander’s original six (not counting the refrain). It also omits her fifth:

The tall trees in the greenwood,
The meadows where we play,
The rushes by the water,
We gather every day …

Understandable, in both cases. The fifth stanza might possibly be re-cast for a modern child (the hymn comes from Mrs. Alexander’s 1848 Hymns for Little Children), perhaps along lines like:

The Xbox and the iPod,
Computer games we play,
The supervised activ'ties,
We're driven to every day …

There’s nothing much you can do with that second stanza, though. Best just flush it down the memory hole. It very likely is the case that some people have higher net worth than others, though it’s a bit indelicate to talk about it. Still, even if this is so, no believer can possibly think that these inequalities come about as a result of divine ordinance. Still less can anyone, believer or unbeliever, think that Mother Nature had anything to do with it. Good grief, no! Believers and unbelievers alike are agreed that if there are indeed inequalities in our society, they result from uneven distribution of opportunity, caused by:

Left Believer: Sinful human nature blinding us to the social justice ethic implicit in the Law, the Gospel, or the Koran, depending on your precise confession.
Right Believer: Social pathologies — illegitimacy, easy divorce, feminism, a corrupt popular culture — arising from ignorance of, or wanton defiance of, the divine plan.
Left Unbeliever: Oppression by the various types of human malignity that inevitably arise in capitalist society: sexism, racism, patriarchy, etc.
Right Unbeliever: Insufficiently rigorous education policy, insufficiently family-friendly tax and health-insurance policies, excessive regulation stifling enterprise, etc.
These notions fill the air. They are the common currency of politics, and the basis for innumerable speeches, sermons, opeds, commencement addresses, and academic papers. There are bits and pieces of truth in them. Some believers do not fully respect the Brotherhood of Man; illegitimacy has dumped a lot of kids in bad neighborhoods, to their disadvantage; human malignity does keep some people down (though not only under capitalism); public policy often is not friendly to free people who want to make the best of themselves.

Yet all those bits and pieces of truth together explain very little about social inequality. What mainly explains it is innate ability. U.S. society today is very nearly a pure meritocracy, perhaps the purest there has ever been. If you display any ability at all in your early years, you will be marked for induction into the overclass, especially if you belong to some designated victim group. (We preen ourselves endlessly — and pardonably — on how much more "inclusive" our present elites are than our past ones. This is one of the ways we avoid thinking about the necessity for any elite to be exclusive in some fashion.) There are still trust-fund kids, but they are not very consequential in this meritocracy.

Seek out the rich man in his castle: It is far more likely the case in the U.S.A. than anywhere else, and far more likely the case in the U.S.A. of today than at any past time, that he is from modest origins, and won his wealth fairly in the fields of business, finance, or the high professions. Seek out the poor man at his gate: It is likewise probable, if you track back through his life, that it will be one of lackluster ability and effort, compounded perhaps perhaps with some serious personality defect. I have two kids in school, eighth grade and tenth. I know several of their classmates. There are some fuzzy cases, but for the most part it is easy to see who is destined for the castle, who for the gate.

Of the deciding factors, by far the largest is intelligence. There are of course smart people who squander their lives, and dumb people who get lucky. If you pluck a hundred rich men from their castles and put them in a room together, though, you will notice a high level of general intelligence. Contrariwise, a hundred poor men taken from their gates will, if put all in one place, convey a general impression of slow dullness. That’s the meritocracy. That’s where we’ve come to. As Herrnstein and Murray put it:

Mathematical necessity tells us that a large majority of the smart people in Cheops' Egypt, dynastic China, Elizabethan England, and Teddy Roosevelt's America were engaged in ordinary pursuits, mingling, working, and living with everyone else. Many were housewives. Most of the rest were farmers, smiths, millers, bakers, carpenters, and shopkeepers. Social and economic stratification was extreme, but cognitive stratification was minor.

So it has been from the beginning of history into [the 20th] century. Then, comparatively rapidly, a new class structure emerged in which it became much more consistently and universally advantageous to be smart.
The problem with this smartocracy is, we have this itchy feeling that it’s un-American.




We Americans are easygoing about inequalities of wealth, much more so than Old World countries. There is something about inequality of smarts that just sets our teeth on edge, though. One of the first jokes ever told to me by an American was this one:

A man finds an old-fashioned oil lamp on the beach. He takes it home and starts cleaning it up. A genie pops out. Genie: "I've been in there so long my powers are weak. I can only grant you one wish, and it's a choice of two. I can either make you super-rich or super-smart. What'll it be?" Man, after a moment's though: "Y'know, I've always been bothered about being kinda slow. Always felt people were laughing at me behind my back. Well, no more of that! Make me super-smart!" Genie: "Done!" The genie vanishes. The man smacks himself on the forehead: "Jeez, I shoulda taken the money!"
Until recently there was quite a strict taboo on mentioning the idea that some people might be smarter than others. Remember what abuse The Bell Curve came in for. It seems to me that we are starting to be a little more open and truthful about these matters. Columnist Chris Satullo in the Philadelphia Inquirer back in May pointed out that the charges of "elitism" then being hurled at Barack Obama were really about smarts.

The charge of elitism isn't about people flaunting income; it's about people flaunting IQ. Americans, as a rule, don't resent people who have more money than them — particularly if the wealth is seen as earned. Envy, maybe, but not resent. You don't resent people whom you hope to emulate. And most Americans dream easily about having much more dough than they do. What Americans more readily resent is someone who is smarter than them, who knows it, who shows it, and who seems to think being smart makes you better than everyone else. A gap in income, you can always dream of closing. A gap in IQ, not so much. It's more personal, thus easier to resent.
A different writer, William Deresiewicz in The American Scholar, wrote recently about the difficulty of talking to a plumber:

It didn't dawn on me that there might be a few holes in my education until I was about 35. I'd just bought a house, the pipes needed fixing, and the plumber was standing in my kitchen. There he was, a short, beefy guy with a goatee and a Red Sox cap and a thick Boston accent, and I suddenly learned that I didn't have the slightest idea what to say to someone like him. So alien was his experience to me, so unguessable his values, so mysterious his very language, that I couldn't succeed in engaging him in a few minutes of small talk before he got down to work. Fourteen years of higher education and a handful of Ivy League [degrees], and there I was, stiff and stupid, struck dumb by my own dumbness. "Ivy retardation," a friend of mine calls this. I could carry on conversations with people from other countries, in other languages, but I couldn't talk to the man who was standing in my own house.
It’s a horrifying story, but not a surprising one. This is indeed what we have come to. An acquaintance of mine, an academic in the human sciences (not Charles Murray) holds the opinion that across an IQ gap of more than one standard deviation (i.e. about 15 points), communication between two people becomes difficult, and that beyond two standard deviations it is effectively impossible.

I'm not sure I'm ready to believe that. I think there is actually an element of art there. Some individuals have a knack, a way of doing it, that allows them to communicate effectively even across 30 I.Q. points. Then again, some don’t. It probably helps not to have been culled out from the herd at an early age, like Mr. Deresiewicz, and segregated off from all contact with poor men at gates — the process known as “an Ivy League education.”

It would probably help, too, if intelligence were not heritable to some large degree. (Forty to 80 percent, say Herrnstein and Murray, which agrees with one’s rule-of-thumb observations.) This means that our cognitive elites are increasingly inbred. Doctors used to marry nurses, professors used to marry their secretaries, business moguls used to marry starlets. Now doctors marry doctors, professors professors, moguls moguls, lawyers lawyers, etc. Those “modest origins” of our meritocratic elites are less modest by the year. We might be drifting towards a caste system, except that meritocracy requires some openness, some vacuuming-up of high-I.Q. outliers from the lower classes, some dumping of low-I.Q. duffers from the elites.

That’s how we are doing things, and the perplexity of William Deresiewicz shows how far we have come. The rich man is in his castle (actually, more likely, his gated community or doorman apartment complex) and the poor man is at his gate. They can’t really talk to each other because the poor man is almost certainly a couple of standard deviations below the rich man in I.Q. score. They don’t want to anyway, because they don’t much like each other. The ignorant condescension of the overclass was exactly what was causing Barack Obama so much trouble back in May — not a mistake he will repeat, I think. He doesn’t seem the type to repeat mistakes. There you have one of the advantages of a high I.Q.: You learn fast.

The converse dislike that the nonelite masses feel for their new masters was on display in the Scooter Libby case. From outside the castles, the walled compounds of the elite, it all looked like a storm in a teacup. Libby was one of them, so nothing much would happen to him. They would take care of him. What else would they do — throw him off the battlements? That never happens. Ten years on he’ll still be one of them. The guy lost a hand in the poker games that are played between different factions of them, that's all, up there in their castles.

From behind the castle moats it all looked different. Those poker games seem far more important to the people playing them than they look to outsiders (or than, in fact, they actually are) because outsiders are hardly ever thought about. Everybody in Libby’s faction of the elite knew him; everybody liked Ol’ Scooter. That he had taken a hit from the other elite faction was an outrage, an occasion of high emotion. I thought I detected, here and there, some Deresiewiczian bafflement among the elites that this emotion did not seem to be much in evidence among people living outside the castle walls. But hey, who really cares about them?

This isn’t one of those columns where I point out a problem and suggest a possible solution. As I remarked in an earlier piece on this general theme:

I wish these … elites had a little more color and dash. I wish they were not so academic. I wish there were some sign of a Churchill among them, or a Roosevelt (Teddy for preference), or an Andy Jackson. I wish they had stronger opinions. I wish they showed more evidence of having courage. I wish, above all, that there were fewer of them. But do I have an alternative to meritocracy? Do I think these [elite college] kids are unspeakably awful, and will drag western civilization down to perdition? Would I prefer my own kids not have a shot at joining them, if they decide they want to? No, and no, and no.
Human society stumbles on forward, from imperfection to, one hopes, lesser imperfection. Our cognitive elites are not lovable. Every so often their arrogance and condescension will come breaking through the surface. It’s a pity there isn’t some way to forcibly mix them with their fellow citizens at some point in their cosseted young adulthood, so that they might at least have a shot at learning how to talk across the I.Q. gap; but in a free society, there is no way to do that. Absent that kind of social engineering, there is nothing for it but to lie back and let them rule us. They’ll probably make a pretty good job of it. They are, after all, the brightest and the best … however much we dislike them.