As Europe Sees Us

An interesting view from 'superhawk' Robert Kagan:

To simplify an already simplistic argument, Europeans and Americans differ specifically on the use of military force and its utility, the legitimacy of power and, more generally, on the question of international order and the role of international institutions and international law. These differences have two main sources. The first is the vast disparity in military capability. It is inherently true that nations which have greater military power tend to use it more, and believe in its legitimacy more, while nations which are weaker tend to believe less in military power and less in its legitimacy, and seek to use mechanisms to constrain those who have more military power.
When I think back to the late 18th century, it’s easy to see the roles were reversed. America’s early statesmen spent a lot of time talking about international law and commerce as the real engine of diplomacy while the Europeans talked about power, realpolitik and raison d’etat. The greatest advocate for international law on the high seas and rules governing the behaviour of navies in the late 18th century was the United States while the greatest opponent of any kind of international legal regulation was Britain, the hegemon of the seas in those days. So it’s not surprising that when the roles are substantially reversed some 200 years later, attitudes towards power are also reversed.
Second, disparities in power lead to different threat assessments. Nations that perceive they have the capacity to deal with threats are less tolerant of them than those that perceive they don’t have the capacity. That’s actually a more controversial point that few people have taken me up on. Americans were less tolerant of Saddam Hussein because we felt we could do something about it; Europeans were more tolerant because they felt they couldn’t do much about it.
There’s also a historical-ideological difference, based in particular on the last 50 years. Europe has sought, as a consequence of two world wars, to make the old rules of balance of power no longer apply so that they will never again commit the horrors that they committed twice last century. This is the driving force behind the European Union, not economics. Fear keeps the EU going—fear that should they start backsliding, they’ll backslide all the way and revert to their military past. America’s history, however, has led it in a different direction. Americans are very proud of their role in World War II and politicians from Dean Acheson to Bill Clinton have taken the view that American power is the best guarantor of international peace and stability. SW: You have urged America and Europe to try and overcome their differences and to recognise and build on what they have in common. Isn’t this largely a cosmetic choice for America rather than a strategic necessity?